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BALANCING PREVENTION AND LIABILITY: THE USE 
OF WAIVER TO LIMIT UNIVERSITY LIABILITY FOR 
STUDENT SUICIDE 
Brittney Kern* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When Ms. Li’s son started university in the fall of 2013, Ms. 
Li was shocked when her son was asked to sign a “student 
management and self discipline agreement,” which freed the 
university from any liability if a student were to commit 
suicide or suffer self-inflicted injuries.1 The City College of 
Dongguan University of Technology, located in the Guangdong 
providence of China, asked its 5,000 incoming freshman to sign 
the contract due, at least in part, to the staggering suicide 
rates that China has seen in the past years.2 And the City 
College is not the first to make this request of its students; 
Shandong Jianzhu University, also located in China, requested 
that its 20,000 students sign a similar waiver of liability in 
November of 2010.3 
According to the American Foundation for Suicide 
Prevention, 38,364 suicides were reported in the United States 
in 2010, equating to a death by suicide every 13.7 minutes.4 
 
* Law Clerk to the Honorable James M. McMaster, Bucks County Court of Common 
Pleas. J.D. 2014, Michigan State University College of Law; B.A. 2011, The 
Pennsylvania State University. The author thanks Professor Daniel Barnhizer for his 
support and feedback in the formulating and drafting of this Article. The author also 
thanks the staff of the Brigham Young Education and Law Journal for their help in 
publishing this piece. 
 1  Chengcheng Jiang, Chinese University Asks Students to Sign ‘Suicide 
Waivers’, Time (Sept. 17, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/09/17/chinese-university-
asks-students-to-sign-suicide-waivers/?hpt=hp_t3; Abby Kloppenburg, Chinese 
university asks students to sign ‘suicide waiver’, USA TODAY (Sep. 20, 2013, 11:27 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/09/20/suicide-waiver-chinese-
college/2841879/. 
 2  See Jiang, supra note 1; Kloppenburg, supra note 1. 
 3  Raymond Li, University attacked for suicide waiver, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (Nov. 10 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.scmp.com/article/729980/university-
attacked-suicide-waiver. 
 4  Facts and Figures, AMERICAN FOUNDATION FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION, 
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Further, statistics estimate that 7% of all college students in 
the United States have suicidal thoughts, while 1% of college 
students attempt suicide.5 With increasing suicide rates among 
their students, colleges and universities across the country 
have taken action. Some schools have ramped up their mental 
health programs and hired more college therapists, while 
others have instituted new policies requiring the expulsion of 
students who display symptoms that indicate the student may 
attempt suicide.6 
Courts have traditionally held that suicide is a “deliberate, 
intentional and intervening act that preclude[d] another’s 
responsibility for the harm.”7 Exceptions to this general rule, 
however, have become more prevalent, particularly in two 
specific cases: (1) “where the individual or entity actually 
caused the suicide”; and (2) “when the individual or entity had 
a duty to prevent the suicide.”8 Courts in the United States 
have overwhelmingly freed colleges and universities from 
liability for student suicide, finding that the schools neither 
caused the suicide nor had a special duty to prevent the 
suicide.9 However, three cases, Schieszler v. Ferrum College,10 
Shin v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology,11 and Leary v. 
Wesleyan University12 have somewhat muddied the waters. 
 
http://www.afsp.org/understanding-suicide/facts-and-figures (last updated Sept. 16, 
2014). 
 5  Susan Snyder, Addressing suicide among seemingly successful college 
students, PHILLY.COM (Feb. 10, 2014), http://articles.philly.com/2014-02-
10/news/47171516_1_college-campuses-college-students-parking-garage. 
 6  For example, when Jordan Nott sought medical treatment after having 
suicidal thoughts caused by a medication he was taking, George Washington 
University evicted him from his dorm room and required that he withdraw from the 
university or else “face suspension, expulsion, or criminal charges for violating the code 
of student conduct.” See infra notes 120–128 and accompanying text; Juhi Kaveeshvar, 
Comment, Kicking the Rock and the Hard Place to the Curb: An Alternative and 
Integrated Approach to Suicidal Students in Higher Education, 57 EMORY L.J. 651, 654 
(2008); see also infra Subsection II.B.4. 
 7  See Kaveeshvar, supra note 6, at 651–52 (citing PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS 311 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984)). 
 8  See Kaveeshvar, supra note 6, at 654–55. 
 9  See generally Bogust v. Iverson, 102 N.W.2d 228 (Wis. 1960); White v. Univ. 
of Wyo., 954 P.2d 983 (Wyo. 1998); Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293 (Iowa 2000); 
Mahoney v. Alleghany College, No. AD 892-2003 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 22, 2005), 
available at http://www.bsk.com/site/files/Mahoney_v._Allegheny_College.pdf. 
 10  Schieszler v. Ferrum College, 236 F. Supp. 2d 602 (W.D. Va. 2002). 
 11  Shin v. MIT, No. 020403, 2005 WL 1869101 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 27, 2005). 
 12  Leary v. Wesleyan University, No. CV055003943, 2009 WL 865679 (Super. 
Ct. Conn. March 10, 2009). 
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These cases suggest that juries may find that a special 
relationship exists and therefore hold schools liable for student 
suicide in the future. 
To date, no college or university in the United States has 
instituted a waiver that releases the school from liability for 
student suicide or self-inflicted harm, but with international 
institutions beginning to do so,13 it is likely that schools in the 
United States may at least consider taking a similar approach. 
Because institutions are able to create binding waivers to 
release themselves from liability for foreseeable negligence,14 a 
suicide waiver, if implemented by colleges in the United States, 
may prevent schools from facing liability for student suicide 
and self-inflicted harm in the future. Additionally, 
implementing waivers of this sort could incentivize the school 
to provide additional help and resources for students suffering 
with mental illnesses, which could help decrease suicide rates 
among college students. However, waivers are unlikely to deter 
student suicide unless schools take further action. 
Part II of this Article discusses the case law history of 
university liability, beginning with an overview of the cases 
that have clearly held that schools are not liable for student 
suicide. Part II then dissects the Schieszler, Shin, and Leary 
cases, in which the courts have been less clear on university 
liability. Part III considers the waiver option by first 
illustrating the law of waiver generally and then exploring the 
different reasons a court may deem a waiver unenforceable. 
Part IV examines possible defenses to the enforceability of 
suicide waivers specifically, drawing on the law of waiver 
discussed in Part III. Part V evaluates the suicide waiver as a 
viable option by comparing it to other policies that universities 
have implemented to suppress liability and prevent student 
suicide. Part V concludes with a brief discussion of the use of 
suicide liability waivers in other forums, such as juvenile 
detention facilities and summer camps. 
 
 13  See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 14  See infra Part III. 
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II. CASE LAW HISTORY OF UNIVERSITY LIABILITY FOR STUDENT 
SUICIDE 
A. Cases Finding No Special Relationship 
Numerous cases across the United States have considered 
the alleged negligence on the part of both the colleges as an 
entity and the individual faculty and staff in relation to 
student suicide.15 Until the early twenty-first century, all of 
these cases were decided in favor of the schools and their 
employees, as the courts found that no special relationship 
existed between the schools and their students.16 
1. Bogust v. Iverson 
In 1960, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered 
whether the director of student personnel of Stout State 
College, Ralph Iverson, was liable for the death of student 
Jeannie Bogust.17 Iverson had been aware of Bogust’s 
“emotional disturbances, social conflicts, scholastic difficulties 
and personal problems,” and had counseled Bogust in an 
attempt to help relieve her of the personal struggles she was 
facing.18 However, despite allegedly knowing that Bogust was 
still facing similar problems, Iverson stopped meeting with 
Bogust in April of 1958.19 Soon after, on May 27th, 1958, 
Bogust committed suicide.20 Bogust’s family sued Iverson, 
alleging that Iverson had (1) “failed to secure or attempt to 
secure emergency psychiatric treatment after he was aware or 
should have been aware of her inability to care for the safety of 
herself”; (2) “failed at all times to advise the said parents of 
Jeanie [sic] Bogust or contact them concerning the true mental 
and emotional state of their said daughter, thus preventing 
them from securing proper medical care for her”; and (3) “failed 
 
 15  See generally Bogust v. Iverson, 102 N.W.2d 228 (Wis. 1960); White v. Univ. 
of Wyo., 954 P.2d 983 (Wyo. 1998); Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293 (Iowa 2000); and 
Mahoney v. Allegheny College, No. AD 892-2003 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 22, 2005), 
available at http://www.bsk.com/site/files/Mahoney_v._Allegheny_College.pdf. 
 16  Many cases, in fact, did not survive a motion for summary judgment in favor 
of the college, or the college’s faculty or staff member. See, e.g., Bogust, 102 N.W.2d at 
228; Jain, 617 N.W.2d at 293. 
 17  Bogust, 102 N.W.2d at 228. 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. at 229. 
 20  Id. 
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to provide proper student guidance.”21 The court noted that the 
only relevant question on appeal was whether Iverson owed 
Bogust a legal duty, a requirement to sustain the claim against 
him.22 The court explained that “before liability can attach[,] 
there must be found a duty resting upon the person against 
whom recovery is sought and then a breach of that duty.”23 
The court focused heavily on the fact that Iverson was 
merely an educator, not “a medical doctor or a specialist in 
mental disorders.”24 As such, the court reasoned, Iverson 
should not be expected to know or recognize any symptoms that 
Bogust displayed that suggested she might inflict self-harm.25 
Additionally, the court noted that there was no indication that 
Iverson was aware of Bogust’s suicidal thoughts or 
tendencies.26 
Perhaps the strongest evidence that swayed the court’s 
holding in favor of Iverson was the fact that there was no 
evidence that Bogust’s condition had worsened as a result of 
the meetings of Iverson and Bogust.27 Because Bogust had a 
history of “suffering from emotional disturbances and social 
conflicts before she came under [Iverson’s] guidance,” the court 
determined that Iverson could not be held liable because 
Bogust’s condition had not further deteriorated under his 
guidance.28 Additionally, because there was no indication that 
 
 21  Id. at 229. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. at 230. (citing Palmer v. Janesville Improvement Co., 219 N.W. 437 (Wis. 
1928); Miller v. Welworth Theatres, 75 N.W.2d 286 (Wis. 1956)). 
 24  Id. 
 25  Id. Specifically, the appellate court reiterated in part the finding of the trial 
court, which stated that “to hold that a teacher who has had no training, education or 
experience in medical fields is required to recognize in a student a condition the 
diagnosis of which is in a specialized and technical medical field[] would require a duty 
beyond reason.” Id. If a similar case were to be heard in the twenty-first century, it is 
likely that the court would find a higher obligation on the part of Iverson, as a director 
of student personnel services today would likely be trained, at least to a minimal 
degree, to spot common symptoms of depression and other mental health diseases. 
 26  Id. 
 27  Id. at 231. 
 28  Id. The court specifically discussed this because Bogust argued that liability 
should attach to Iverson based upon the Restatement of Torts, which states that “[t]he 
liability which this Section recognizes is not imposed as a penalty for the actor’s 
original misconduct, but for a breach of a separate duty to aid and protect the other 
after his helpless condition caused by the actor’s misconduct is or should be known.” Id. 
(quoting Restatement of Torts § 322, cmt. d (1934)). However, the court noted that the 
Restatement also, and perhaps more clearly, states that “[o]ne who gratuitously 
renders services to another, otherwise than by taking charge of him when helpless, is 
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Bogust’s condition had worsened between when Iverson 
discontinued the meetings and Bogust’s suicide, the court 
determined that Iverson could not have anticipated Bogust’s 
imminent suicide.29 After considering these factors, the court 
ultimately determined that Iverson could not be held liable for 
Bogust’s death.30 
2. Jain v. State 
In 2000, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the 
University of Iowa had not formed a special relationship with 
Sanjay Jain, who was a freshman at the university when he 
took his life.31 On November 20, 1994, resident assistants were 
beckoned to Jain’s dorm room where they found Jain and his 
girlfriend “fighting over a set of keys to Sanjay’s moped,” which 
had been moved into Jain’s dorm room.32 Jain’s girlfriend 
explained to the resident assistants that Jain was “preparing to 
commit suicide by inhaling the exhaust fumes[,] and she was 
merely trying to stop him.”33 Jain admitted that he intended to 
commit suicide that night. The resident assistants resolved to 
meet with Jain the next morning.34 The next day, Jain met 
with Beth Merritt, an employee of the university, who referred 
him to the university’s counseling services and required that he 
 
not subject to liability for discontinuing the services if he does not thereby leave the 
other in a worse position than he was in when the services were begun.” Id. (quoting 
Restatement of Torts § 323(2) (1934)). Accordingly, because the court determined that 
Bogust was in no worse condition when she and Iverson stopped meeting than when 
the interviews began, Iverson could not be held liable for her suicide. Id. 
 29  Id. at 231–33. Specifically, the court stated that: 
It is also significant that the complaint pleads no facts with respect to Jeannie’s 
activities or mental condition during the period from April 15 to May 27, 1958. 
There are no facts alleged which, if proved, would establish a cause-effect 
relationship between the alleged nonfeasance of the defendant and the suicide of 
the deceased. 
Id. at 232. This is interesting language on the part of the court, as it seems to suggest 
that if there were facts alleged that suggested a cause-effect relationship between 
Iverson’s failure to maintain the interviews with Bogust and Bogust’s suicide, the court 
may have found Iverson liable for Bogust’s death. However, this is mere speculation, as 
the court did not take this point any further. 
 30  Id. at 233. 
 31  Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293 (Iowa 2000). 
 32  Id. 
 33  Id. Further, Jain’s roommate later testified that Jain stated that “he would 
kill himself by running the cycle in the room . . . when [the roommate] was not there,” a 
threat that the roommate believed to be a joke. Id. at 296. 
 34  Id. 
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remove the moped from his room.35 Merritt then met with 
David Coleman, the assistant director for resident life, and 
explained that she was concerned for Jain’s safety and 
suggested that the university contact Jain’s parents.36 Coleman 
refused her request, and Jain’s parents were never made aware 
of his suicidal thoughts and actions.37 On an early December 
morning, Jain was found dead in his dorm room; he had died 
from inhalation of carbon monoxide from his moped, which he 
had left running in his room overnight.38 
Jain’s father, Uttam Jain, brought suit against the 
University of Iowa and claimed that because the university was 
aware of Jain’s mental condition, a special relationship existed 
between the university and Jain.39 First, in considering this 
claim, the court considered an exception found in the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA or Buckley 
Amendment), which “permits institutions to disclose otherwise 
confidential information to ‘appropriate parties’ when an 
‘emergency’ makes it necessary to protect the health or safety 
of the student or other persons.’”40 However, the court quickly 
dismissed this exception, noting that it is discretionary, not 
mandatory, and, more importantly here, that Uttam Jain had 
not preserved this issue for appellate review.41 
Next, the court turned to Uttam Jain’s claim under the 
 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. at 295–96. 
 37  Id. at 296. 
 38  Id. 
 39  Id. at 297. Specifically, Uttam Jain relied upon Restatement (Second) of Torts 
section 323, which states that: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to 
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s 
person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting 
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or 
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking. 
Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965)). Notably, this is the same, 
though updated from the Restatement (First) to the Restatement (Second), section of 
the Restatement that Bogust’s family relied on in Bogust v. Iverson. See Bogust v. 
Iverson, 10 Wis.2d 129, 135 (1960). 
 40  Jain, 617 N.W.2d at 298 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(I)). 
 41  Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 99.36(a) (1994)). The court does express its “serious 
doubts about the merits of plaintiff’s argument,” but the court did not go any further 
into a possible requirement under this FERPA exception, which may leave later courts 
with the ability to hold that FERPA’s “discretionary” disclosure exception should be 
“‘strictly construed,’” as a regulation that appears within FERPA suggests. Id. (quoting 
34 C.F.R. § 99.36(b) (1994)). 
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Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 323 “that the university 
has voluntarily adopted a policy (consistent with the Buckley 
Amendment) of notifying parents when a student engages in 
self-destructive behavior[,] but it negligently failed to act on 
that policy in the case of Sanjay Jain.”42 However, this section 
of the Restatement requires, as iterated by the court in Bogust, 
that the student must have been in a worse position as a result 
of the intervention by the university.43 Ultimately, the court 
determined that “the university’s limited intervention in this 
case neither increased the risk that Sanjay would commit 
suicide nor led him to abandon other avenues of relief from his 
distress. Thus, no legal duty on the part of the university arose 
under Restatement section 323 as a matter of law.”44 Finding 
that no special relationship existed, the court affirmed the 
award of summary judgment in favor of the university.45 
3. Mahoney v. Alleghany College 
In late 2005, a Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas found 
that no special relationship existed between Allegheny College 
and Chuck Mahoney, a junior at the school.46 Mahoney sought 
the help of Jacquelyn Kondrot, an Allegheny College counselor, 
after suffering a panic attack at football camp the summer 
before his freshman year.47 Mahoney continued to meet with 
Kondrot regularly over the next three years, with increased 
frequency at times of personal turmoil for Mahoney.48 In some 
of these meetings, Mahoney discussed his suicidal thoughts 
 
 42  Id. According to the court: 
The record reveals that an unwritten university policy dealing with self-
destructive behavior dictates that, with evidence of a suicide attempt, university 
officials will contact a student’s parents. The decision to do so rests solely with 
Phillip Jones, the dean of students. The dean bases his decision on information 
gathered from a variety of sources. In this case, no information was transmitted to 
the dean’s office until after his death. 
Id. at 296 (emphasis added). 
 43  Id. at 299. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts §323(a)–(b) (1965). 
 44  Id. at 300. 
 45  Id. 
 46  Mahoney v. Alleghany College, No. AD 892-2003 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 22, 
2005), available at http://www.bsk.com/site/files/Mahoney_v._Allegheny_College.pdf. 
 47  Mahoney, No. AD 892-2003, slip op. at 3. 
 48  Id. at 3–7. In particular, Mahoney sought the help of Kondrot during his 
tumultuous relationship with his on-and-off-again girlfriend Kristen, particularly when 
Kristen began dating one of his fraternity brothers. Id. at 9. Kristen also sought 
Kondrot’s help for Mahoney on more than one occasion, when Mahoney was feeling 
particularly suicidal and would make suicidal comments to her. Id. at 3, 5. 
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and even described how he planned to eventually commit 
suicide;49 however, Kondrot always ensured that Mahoney was 
in good spirits before he left their counseling sessions.50 
Kondrot contemplated calling Mahoney’s parents to discuss 
Mahoney’s suicidal thoughts, but Mahoney pleaded with her 
not to do so.51 Ultimately, neither Kondrot nor any other school 
official ever contacted Mahoney’s parents.52 
After Mahoney’s suicide, his parents brought suit against 
the school.53 Specifically, the suit alleged, in part, that the 
defendants “(1) breached a ‘duty of care’ to prevent the 
student’s suicide; [and] (2) had a duty to notify the parents 
about their son’s mental health problems.”54 The court began 
its analysis of this case by laying out the factors that must be 
balanced to determine whether a duty of care exists.55 
According to the court, these factors include (1) “[t]he 
relationship between the parties”; (2) “[t]he social utility of 
defendant’s conduct”; (3) “[t]he nature of risk imposed and 
foreseeability of harm incurred”; (4) “[t]he consequences of 
imposing a duty upon the defendant”; and (5) “[t]he overall 
public interest in a proposed solution.”56 The court then 
considered whether a duty existed in three separate ways: first, 
whether the school had a duty to prevent suicide under 
Pennsylvania law;57 second, whether the school had a “duty to 
prevent suicide where there is a ‘special relationship’ and harm 
 
 49  Id. at 6. Mahoney told Kondrot only a few weeks before his death that he 
would overdose on sleeping pills to cause his own death. Id. 
 50  Id. at 11. 
 51  Id. at 10. 
 52  Id. at 13. 
 53  Id. at 2. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Id. at 14–15 (quoting Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000 (Pa. 2003)). 
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. at 15. No Pennsylvania case had ever before imposed a duty to prevent 
another’s suicide in the college setting. Id. However, the court noted that while a 
general duty to prevent the suicide of another has not been found, 
[t]here are, however, limited exceptions to this rule. For example, Pennsylvania 
has recognized suicide as a legitimate basis for wrongful death claims involving 
hospitals, mental health institutions and mental health professionals, where there 
is a custodial relationship and the defendant has a recognized duty of care towards 
the decedent. . . . In other cases, where the decedent was not associated with a 
hospital or mental health institution, courts have required both a clear showing of 
a duty to prevent the decedent’s suicide and a direct causal connection between the 
alleged negligence and the suicide. 
Id. at 16 (quoting McPeak v. William T. Cannon, Esquire, P.C., 553 A.2d 439, 440 (Pa. 
Super. 1989)). 
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is reasonably foreseeable”;58 and third, whether the school had 
a duty to notify Mahoney’s family.59 
The court in Mahoney repeatedly referred to the Jain case, 
finding the situation analogous to the facts in the present 
case.60 Here, the court similarly found that no special 
relationship existed, in part because “Allegheny College did not 
have a custodial relationship with Mahoney who was an adult 
who lived in an off campus fraternity house.”61 This 
determination limited the case significantly, but in 2006, the 
case was presented to a jury, which cleared Allegheny College 
of any liability for Mahoney’s death.62 
B. Cases Suggesting a Special Relationship May Exist: Is 
Change Imminent? 
Despite the trend of courts finding that no special 
relationship exists between colleges and their students in 
student-suicide situations, three relatively recent cases have 
found that a special relationship could in fact exist.63 In the 
Schieszler, Shin, and Leary cases, the trial judges determined 
that a jury may find a special relationship; however, each case 
was settled before it went to the jury.64 While none of these 
 
 58  Id. at 16. In describing the “special relationship” analysis, the court looked to 
the Shin and Schieszler cases for guidance. See infra Subsections II.B.1 and II.B.2. 
 59  Id. at 18. Here, the court discussed the same FERPA exception that the Jain 
court examined. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. Additionally, the 
Mahoney court noted the psychologist-patient privilege that makes all privileged 
communications between an individual and his therapist confidential, which only 
complicates the disclosure argument. Mahoney, No. AD 892-2003, slip op. at 19. 
 60  Id. at 20–22. 
 61  Id. at 22. Further, the court distinguished this case from the Shin and 
Schieszler cases, finding those cases 
factually distinctive in their neither precedential, nor non-persuasive finding of a 
‘special relaitonship’ and ‘imminent probability’ of self-harm in consideration of 
the student’s assertions that they were going to kill themselves as well as their 
past and contemporaneous attempts to do so; such was within the knowledge of 
said college employees, as compared to Mahoney who despite a progressively 
deepening depression, had neither engaged in nor threatened any specific acts of 
self-harm. 
Id. at 23. 
 62  Id.; see also Valerie Kravets Cohen, Note, Keeping Students Alive: Mandating 
On-Campus Counseling Saves Suicidal College Students and Limits Liability, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3081, 3094 (2007). 
 63  See generally Shin v. MIT, No. 020403, 2005 WL 1869101 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
June 27, 2005); Schieszler v. Ferrum College, 236 F. Supp. 2d 602 (W.D. Va. 2002); 
Leary v. Wesleyan University, No. CV055003943, 2009 WL 865679 (Super. Ct. Conn. 
March 10, 2009). 
 64  See generally Shin v. MIT, No. 020403, 2005 WL 1869101 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
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cases provides strong authority for future cases considering a 
college’s liability for student suicide, they do suggest that a 
change in analysis could be imminent. This change may lead 
more courts to acknowledge that special relationships exist 
between schools and their students. 
1. Schieszler v. Ferrum College 
Michael Frentzel was a freshman at Ferrum College, but he 
had trouble adjusting to his new environment.65 In February 
2000, during Frentzel’s second semester, campus police and 
Odessa Holley, the resident assistant in Frentzel’s dorm, 
responded to an argument between Frentzel and his girlfriend, 
Crystal.66 Frentzel later gave Crystal a note indicating that he 
intended to hang himself in his dorm room.67 Crystal shared 
the note with Holley and the campus police.68 Upon breaking 
into Frentzel’s dorm room, campus police and Holley found 
Frentzel with bruising on his head, which Frentzel admitted 
was self inflicted.69 Campus police alerted the dean of student 
affairs, David Necombe, of the incident, and Necombe required 
that Frentzel sign a document stating that he would not harm 
himself.70 A few days later, Frentzel sent two more notes to 
Crystal, who again shared them with Holley and the campus 
police.71 When Holley and the campus police finally checked on 
Frentzel, they found him dead in his dorm room.72 
Frentzel’s guardian, LaVerne Schieszler, brought suit 
against Ferrum College, Necombe, and Holley, alleging “that 
the defendants ‘knew or personally should have known that 
Frentzel was likely to attempt to hurt himself if not properly 
supervised,’ that they were ‘negligent by failing to take 
adequate precautions to insure [sic] that Frentzel did not hurt 
 
June 27, 2005); Schieszler, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 602. See also Cohen, supra note 62, at 
3095–3100. 
 65  Schieszler, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 605. In his first semester, for example, the 
school required Frentzel to attend anger management counseling as a condition of 
reenrolling in his second semester. Id. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. The police failed to respond to the first note and prohibited Crystal from 
entering Frentzel’s dorm room to check on him. Id. 
 72  Id. 
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himself,’ and that Frentzel died as a result.”73 The defendants 
argued, in part, that they “had no legal duty to take steps to 
prevent Frentzel from killing himself.”74 When Schieszler 
moved to file an amended complaint, the defendants objected, 
claiming that the complaint failed to state a claim for which 
relief could be granted,75 which led the trial court judge to 
consider whether a jury could find that Ferrum College could 
be liable. 
The judge first noted that “[o]rdinarily, there is no 
affirmative duty to act to assist or protect another absent 
unusual circumstances, which justify imposing such an 
affirmative responsibility.”76 However, the judge wrote that the 
Virginia Supreme Court has determined that “a special 
relationship may exist between particular plaintiffs and 
defendants because of the particular factual circumstances in a 
given case.”77 The judge then considered the specific facts of 
this case, as outlined in Schieszler’s complaint, including that 
(1) Frentzel lived in on-campus housing; (2) Ferrum College, 
Necombe, and Holley were personally aware of Frentzel’s 
mental health problems, as they had previously required him 
to attend anger management courses before returning for his 
second semester of schooling; (3) Frentzel had self-inflicted 
bruising on his head just one day before his death; (4) Frentzel 
sent a note to Crystal, who had shared the note with the 
campus police and Holley, indicating that he intended to kill 
himself; and, perhaps most importantly, (5) Necombe suspected 
 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. 
 76  Id. at 606. Specifically, the judge relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 314A, which provides a nonexclusive list of special relationships, “including the 
relationship between a common carrier and its passengers, an innkeeper and his 
guests, a possessor of land and his invitees, and one who takes custody of another 
thereby depriving him of other assistance.” Id. at 606–07 (citing Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 314A cmt. b (1965)). 
 77  Id. at 607 (citing Thompson v. Skate America, 540 S.E.2d 123 (Va. 2001)). For 
example, the judge considered Burdette v. Marks, a 1992 Virginia Supreme Court case 
in which “the Court considered whether a special relationship existed between a police 
officer and a passerby such that the officer had a duty to protect the passerby from an 
attack.” Id. (citing Burdette v. Marks, 421 S.E.2d 419 (Va. 1992)). The Virginia 
Supreme Court considered that the police officer saw the passerby being attacked; the 
police officer was on duty and carrying his weapon, which decreased the likelihood that 
the police officer would be injured in an effort to protect the passerby; and the passerby 
asked the police officer for help. Id. The Virginia Supreme Court ultimately determined 
that a special relationship did exist given the specific facts of this case. Id. 
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that Frentzel could harm himself, as evidenced by his requiring 
Frentzel to sign a statement indicating that he would not harm 
himself.78 Given these facts and other considerations,79 the 
judge granted Schieszler’s motion to file an amended 
complaint, explaining that a jury could find that a special 
relationship existed between Ferrum College and Frentzel.80 
However, the case settled before trial, leaving the question of 
whether a special relationship did in fact exist unresolved.81 
2. Shin v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Elizabeth Shin was in the second semester of her freshman 
year at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) when she 
first began to exhibit suicidal tendencies.82 From that semester 
forward, numerous MIT employees were on notice of and 
involved in treating Shin’s mental-health disease. These 
employees included the housemaster of her dorm, Nina Davis-
Millis, and the dean of Counseling and Support Services, 
Arnold Henderson.83 Shin’s mental health continued to 
deteriorate during her sophomore year, at which point she was 
hospitalized for a second time and met almost daily with a 
member of the MIT staff.84 Early in the morning of April 10, 
2000, during the spring semester of Shin’s sophomore year, two 
students residing in Shin’s dorm alerted Davis-Millis that Shin 
“had told them that she planned to kill herself that day and 
requested one of the students to erase her computer files.”85 
 
 78  Id. at 609. 
 79  The judge also considered that “‘[p]arents, students, and the general 
community still have a reasonable expectation, fostered in part by colleges themselves, 
that reasonable care will be exercised to protect resident students from foreseeable 
harm.’” Id. at 610 (quoting Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 
1983)). Additionally, the judge distinguished this case from both Bogust and Jain, 
finding that both of those cases were decided by considering whether liability attached 
under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323, which was not a theory that Schieszler 
brought before the judge in this case. Id. at 608. 
 80  Id. at 615. 
 81  See Cohen, supra note 62, at 3097. 
 82  Shin v. MIT, No. 020403, 2005 WL 1869101, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 27, 
2005). During this semester, she overdosed on Tylenol with codeine and was 
hospitalized for a week. Id. While undergoing a psychiatric evaluation, Shin admitted 
that she had cut herself in high school. Id. 
 83  Id. at *1, *2. In addition to Davis-Millis and Henderson, at least two MIT 
psychiatrists, two professors, a teaching assistant, and a social worker were made 
aware of and personally assisted Shin with her mental health. Id. at *1–3. 
 84  Id. at *2–4. 
 85  Id. at *5. Davis-Millis contacted the on-call psychiatrist at MIT, who did not 
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Later that morning, Davis-Millis spoke with Shin on the 
phone.86 During their conversation, Shin made “disturbing” 
comments such as “‘[y]ou won’t have to worry about me any 
more,’ or words to that effect.”87 A few hours later, a “deans and 
psychs” meeting was held to discuss the report made by the two 
students that Shin intended to kill herself that same day.88 
During the meeting, Henderson, among other attendees, 
discussed a plan of action for helping Shin.89 Following the 
meeting, a voicemail was left for Shin to let her know about the 
deans and psychs meeting and that an appointment at an 
external counseling center had been made for her for the next 
day.90 No further action was made that day by anyone on the 
MIT staff.91 That night, MIT campus police were called to 
Shin’s dorm room after her smoke detector began to sound.92 
Shin had set herself on fire and suffered burns on sixty-five 
percent of her body.93 Shin’s parents removed her from life 
support four days later, after the doctors told them that Shin 
had “suffered irreversible neurological brain damage.”94 
Shin’s parents brought suit against MIT, Davis-Millis, 
Henderson, and others following their daughter’s death, 
alleging in part that Davis-Millis and Henderson had a duty to 
prevent the suicide due to their special relationship with 
Shin.95 Davis-Millis and Henderson moved for summary 
judgment, claiming that no special relationship existed and 
that they did not have a duty to prevent Shin’s suicide.96 The 
judge ultimately found that there was a question of fact for a 
 
think that Shin needed to be brought to the counseling center because “(1) Elizabeth 
had assured him that she was fine and (2) her friends had overreacted [about another] 
episode.” Id. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. 
 88  Id. 
 89  Id. 
 90  Id. 
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id. at *5–6. 
 95  Id. at *1, *11. 
 96  Id. at *11. Davis-Mills and Henderson provided the court with a 
Massachusetts law that illustrates “that persons who are not treating clinicians have a 
duty to prevent suicide only if (1) they caused the decedent’s uncontrollable suicidal 
condition, or (2) they had the decedent in their physical custody, such as a mental 
hospital or prison, and had knowledge of the decedent’s risk of suicide.” Id. The judge 
agreed that neither of these exceptions applied to this case. Id. 
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jury as to whether a special relationship existed such that 
Davis-Millis and Henderson would have a duty to prevent the 
suicide.97 In making this determination, the judge relied 
heavily on Section 314A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
the same section that the judge in Schieszler relied upon.98 
Further, the judge in the Shin case relied on the Schieszler 
case directly, particularly in noting that because a special 
relationship existed between the defendants and the student, 
the defendants owed the student a duty of care.99 
In Shin, the judge found the facts to be analogous to those 
in the Schieszler case, particularly in that Henderson and 
Davis-Millis knew of Shin’s mental health disease for at least a 
year before her suicide.100 Furthermore, both Henderson and 
Davis-Millis were well aware of the report from students in 
Shin’s dorm that she intended to commit suicide on the date 
that she actually attempted to kill herself, and Henderson and 
Davis-Millis had heard concerns from Shin’s professors 
regarding Shin’s mental health as well.101 Because the judge 
determined that the “[p]laintiffs have provided sufficient 
evidence that Henderson and Davis-Mills could reasonably 
foresee that Elizabeth would hurt herself without proper 
supervision,” a “‘special relationship’ . . . imposing a duty on 
Henderson and Davis-Millis to exercise reasonable care to 
protect [Shin] from harm” was formed.102 Accordingly, the judge 
denied Davis-Millis and Henderson’s request for summary 
judgment;103 however, the case against Davis-Millis and 
Henderson was never heard by a jury because the parties 
settled out of court.104 
 
 97  Id. at *11, *13. 
 98  Id. at *12; see supra note 762. Additionally, the judge in the present case also 
relied on Mullins v. Pine Manor College, which was cited in the Schieszler case. Id.; see 
supra note 85. In this case, a student was kidnapped from her dormitory and raped. Id. 
(citing Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983)). The court in that 
case found that the college “owed a duty to exercise care to protect the well-being of 
their current students, including seeking to protect them against the criminal acts of 
third parties.” Id. 
 99  Id. at *13 (citing Schieszler v. Ferrum College, 236 F.Supp. 2d 602 (W.D. Va. 
2002)). 
 100  Id. 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. 
 103  Id. at *15. 
 104  See Cohen, supra note 62, at 3099. 
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3. Leary v. Wesleyan University 
In November of 2003, Terence Leary had an extreme panic 
attack while he was enrolled at Wesleyan University.105 Leary 
called Wesleyan University’s public safety officers, who 
responded and transported him to Middlesex Memorial 
Hospital.106 The public safety officers left Leary at the hospital 
“without further investigating or securing medical attention for 
him.”107 Soon after, Leary left the hospital and committed 
suicide.108 
Douglas Leary, the administrator of Leary’s estate, filed a 
complaint against the university for negligence.109 In his claim, 
Douglas Leary asserted that the university “knew or should 
have known that Terence Leary was in a distressed condition, 
had suicidal tendencies and was a threat to himself, and they 
failed to investigate or provide Leary with adequate care.”110 
Wesleyan denied any liability for negligence, specifically 
asserting that Leary’s injuries were caused by “intentional acts 
on the part of Terence Leary” himself.111 
First, the court considered whether a special relationship 
existed between Leary and the university.112 Though the court 
did not cite directly to Schieszler or Shin, the court nonetheless 
came to a similar conclusion, determining that a jury could find 
that a special relationship existed.113 The judge next considered 
whether the public safety officers had a duty under the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts Sections 323 and 324.114 Here, 
 
 105  Leary v. Wesleyan University, No. CV055003943, 2009 WL 865679, at *1 
(Super. Ct. Conn. March 10, 2009). 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Id. 
 109  Id. 
 110  Id. Douglas Leary asserted a total of six claims within his suit for negligence 
and also asserted a claim for breach of the university’s fiduciary duty to Leary. Id. 
 111  Id. 
 112  Id. at *2. 
 113  Id. at *5. However, this court relied not so much in the specific facts of this 
case forming a special relationship, as the Schieszler and Shin judges did, but rather 
relied on the custodial exception. Id. at *4–5. Here, the judge determined that there 
was a question of material fact concerning whether Leary was in the custody of the 
public safety officers and unable to provide help for himself. Id. If this were to be the 
case, then an exception to the special relationship rule may apply. Id. at *5. 
 114  Id. at *5–6. It is interesting to note that neither Schieszler nor Shin 
considered these Restatement sections, but Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 was 
considered in Bogust and Jain. See supra notes 28, 44 and accompanying text. 
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the court found that because the public safety officers 
voluntarily provided services to Leary, they may have assumed 
a duty under the Restatement (Second) of Torts.115 The judge 
determined that the question of whether a duty existed was a 
substantial issue of material fact, and this question could only 
be answered by a jury.116 Finally, the court considered whether 
Leary’s suicide was foreseeable to the university and 
determined that an issue of material fact existed regarding 
foreseeability as well.117 Accordingly, the university’s request 
for summary judgment on the negligence claim was denied.118 
4. Possible Consequences of Cases Finding that a Special 
Relationship Might Exist 
With these three cases independently determining that a 
special relationship may exist between a school and a student 
who has committed suicide, it is evident that there may be a 
reversal in the trend of courts finding that no university 
liability exists. Although none of the cases listed in this Section 
has been presented to juries, much less returned a verdict in 
favor of the students’ parents or estates, there seems to be a 
movement towards holding the higher-education institution 
more accountable for student suicides, especially when the 
school has been involved in treating the student.119 However, 
until a case is tried before a jury, it is unclear whether a jury 
would be willing to find a school liable for the suicide of one of 
its students. 
Perhaps in part due to these recent cases, some schools 
have made policy changes regarding students who exhibit signs 
of suicidal behavior. For instance, George Washington 
University (GW) has enacted policies under which students 
who show suicidal tendencies may be evicted from on-campus 
housing, suspended, asked to withdraw from courses, or even 
 
 115  Id. at *5–8. 
 116  Id. at *8. 
 117  Id. at *8–10. There was conflicting testimony as to this question, as an expert 
for Daniel Leary testified that “suicide would be foreseeable to the public safety officers 
under the circumstances of the case,” while an expert for the university “stated that 
Terence Leary’s suicide would not be foreseeable to non-professionals.” Id. at *10. 
Finding once again that an issue of material fact existed, the judge concluded that this 
question must be answered by a jury. Id. 
 118  Id. at *13. 
 119  See generally Subsections II.B.1, II.B.2, and II.B.3. 
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expelled from the school.120 
In the fall of 2004, Jordan Nott, a student at GW, started 
having severely depressive thoughts as a side effect, he 
believed, of medication that he had been taking for a few 
weeks.121 Nott asked a friend to take him to the university’s 
hospital for psychiatric help in the early morning of October 27, 
2004.122 He was admitted to the hospital and the school was 
notified.123 That same day, the school informed Nott “that 
consistent with the University residence hall’s policy on 
‘Psychological Distress,’ as a student who was subject to 
emergency psychological intervention or hospitalization, he 
was not permitted to return to his dorm room.”124 The next day, 
on October 28, 2004, Nott was informed that “he was 
suspended from the University and was charged with a 
disciplinary action.”125 He was told that “if he came onto 
campus for any reason, he would be considered a trespasser 
and could be arrested.”126 Nott sued the university for 
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
Rehabilitation Act, Fair Housing Act, and D.C. Human Rights 
Act, and also for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
invasion of privacy, and breach of confidential relationship.127 
Nott and the university settled the lawsuit in 2006, but the 
university has not admitted to any wrongdoing or changed its 
policy following this incident.128 
With some students now facing the choice between getting 
help with their mental-health diseases and staying enrolled in 
their higher-education program, it is quite clear that some 
reform is needed. Not only do policies like the one enacted by 
GW threaten student well being, but they also do not protect 
the schools from later lawsuits, as illustrated by Nott’s claim 
against GW. Rather than having policies that actively punish 
 
 120  See generally Aaron Konopasky, Note, Eliminating Harmful Suicide Policies 
in Higher Education, 19 STAN. L & POL’Y REV. 328, 328–29 (2008); Kaveeshvar, supra 
note 6, at 651–52. 
 121  First Amended Complaint at 5, Nott v. George Washington Univ., No. 05-
8503 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 2005). 
 122  Id. 
 123  Id. 
 124  Id. 
 125 Id. at 5–6. 
 126  Id. 
 127  Id. at 3. 
 128  See Kaveeshvar, supra note 6, at 651–52. 
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students for seeking help, universities may want to implement 
suicide liability waivers, which could waive any liability for 
negligence on the part of the schools and their employees for 
helping a troubled student. 
III. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF WAIVERS 
Waiver is a mix of contract and tort law, and waivers 
“‘are . . . written documents in which one party agrees to 
release, or “exculpate,” another from potential tort liability for 
future conduct covered in the agreement.’”129 The two most 
common forms of waiver are waiver of liability and express 
assumption of the risk.130 Under waiver of liability, “a party is 
asked to sign a ‘written instrument in which the participant 
agrees not to hold the provider liable for any injuries or 
damages resulting from the provider’s negligence.’”131 Under 
express assumption of the risk, “‘the [participant], in advance, 
expressly consents . . . ‘to relieve the [provider] of an obligation 
of conduct toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a 
known risk arising from what the [provider] is to do or leave 
undone . . . .’”132 An express assumption of the risk agreement, 
then, waives any duty on the part of the provider, which 
protects the provider from any liability for negligence as 
against the participant.133 
Traditionally, courts tend to enforce waivers, seemingly 
equating a waiver to any other contract that requires mutual 
assent and consideration. However, courts also regularly find 
waivers to be unenforceable for a variety of reasons, the vast 
majority of which stem from one of two overall themes: (1) 
unenforceable based on contract law; or (2) unenforceable 
based on public policy.134 Each of these categories is discussed 
 
 129  Robert S. Nelson, Comment, The Theory of the Waiver Scale: An Argument 
Why Parents Should Be Able to Waive Their Children’s Tort Liability Claims, 36 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 535, 541 (2002) (quoting Joseph H. King, Jr., Exculpatory Agreements for 
Volunteers in Youth Activities—The Alternative to “Nerf” Tiddlywinks, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 
683, 683 (1992)). 
 130  Nelson, supra note 129, at 542. 
 131  Id. (quoting Mario R. Arango & William R. Trueba, Jr., The Sports Chamber: 
Exculpatory Agreements Under Pressure, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 7–8 
(1997)). 
 132  Id. (quoting Saenz v. Whitewater Voyages, 276 Cal. Rptr. 672, 676 (Ct. App. 
1990) (alterations in the original)). 
 133  Id. 
 134  Id. at 544. See also Mary Ann Connell & Frederick G. Savage, Releases: Is 
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in detail in the following Subsections. 
A. Waivers Unenforceable by Contract 
Waivers that are unenforceable under contract law can be 
deemed unenforceable for a number of reasons. However, three 
of the most common reasons concern (1) unclear drafting; (2) 
inconspicuous language; and (3) unconscionability.135 
1. Drafting 
First, a court may deem a waiver unenforceable if the 
language is vague, unclear, or ambiguous.136 Importantly, a 
waiver must be written in language that the signer will be able 
to understand, so the level of clarity required for waivers often 
depends on the intended signer.137 However, regardless of the 
comprehension level of the intended audience, courts have 
found that waivers with excessive legalese, which is often 
incomprehensible to the average person, are unenforceable, as 
it is unlikely that an individual would be able to fully 
understand the form he signed.138 
In addition to being clear enough that the intended 
audience is able to understand the terms of the waiver, a 
waiver must also be specific enough to clearly articulate exactly 
what rights the signing party is waiving.139 This, however, does 
not mean that the waiver must clearly articulate each and 
every possible instance or scenario for which the signing party 
is waiving his rights in an exclusive list.140 Rather, courts 
consider whether the waiver sufficiently covers the situation 
 
There Still a Place for Their Use by Colleges and Universities?, 29 J.C. & U.L. 579 
(2003). 
 135  See Nelson, supra note 129, at 546–49. 
 136  Id. at 546. 
 137  Id. For example, consider a waiver that is intended for use by college 
students to participate in a physical education class and a waiver that is intended to be 
used by professional hockey players for a hockey game. The former waiver would need 
to be written in language that an average eighteen-year-old student would understand 
and would likely need to not contain language highly specific to the athletic industry 
that a layman would not understand. However, the latter waiver, intended for 
individuals who compete at a high level within their sport and who have signed 
waivers of a similar kind, could likely use more advanced language that a professional 
hockey player would know. A court, in considering whether a specific waiver was 
sufficiently clear, would consider the waiver’s intended audience in this manner. 
 138  Id. 
 139  Id. at 546–47. 
 140  Id. 
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for which the signing party would otherwise be able to bring 
suit against the party protected by the waiver.141 
2. Conspicuous Language 
Next, courts require that waiver clauses be set apart from 
other contractual language in conspicuous language.142 
Generally speaking, this requirement ensures that the 
individuals creating the waiver do not hide waiver language in 
the middle of a long document or in small print at the bottom of 
the page. Instead, courts require that waivers be placed 
conspicuously in the contract; however, whether a specific 
waiver is deemed conspicuous is considered on a case-by-case 
basis, as the entirety of the document must be examined. 
For example, for a waiver that is included in a larger 
contract to be held enforceable, a court may require that the 
font of the waiver language is larger than the rest of the text, is 
highlighted, or is in some other way separate from the rest of 
the body of the contract to ensure that the waiver is seen by the 
signing party.143 However, if the waiver is on its own sheet of 
paper, with no other terms or agreements listed on the same 
piece of paper, a court would likely not require that the 
typeface of the waiver be exceptionally large or highlighted.144 
 
 141  For example, consider the following hypothetical waiver: “Traveler releases 
all claims for liability against Bussing Company and its employees for any delay or 
collision caused by the negligence of bussing company, its employees, or another 
passenger.” The traveler signs the waiver, and the bus subsequently collides with 
another vehicle due to the negligence of Bus Driver, injuring Traveler. It is likely that a 
court would find this waiver to be enforceable if Traveler later brings suit against 
Bussing Company, as this situation is clearly included in the waiver. Cf. infra 
Subsection IV.B. (discussing that a bussing company may not be able to waive liability 
if it is considered necessary for public good). Now consider that Traveler, having signed 
the same waiver, is injured when Bus Driver shoots Traveler with a gun that Bus 
Driver brought onto the bus with him. If Traveler were to bring suit against Bussing 
Company for their negligence in hiring Bus Driver, it is unlikely that a court would 
find the waiver enforceable and applicable to this specific situation because it is 
unlikely that Traveler would have understood that she was waiving liability for this 
type of negligence. 
 142  See Nelson, supra note 129, at 547. 
 143  Under this same rationale, then, waiver language that is included on page 
twenty of a sixty-page document in the same typeface as the rest of the document 
would likely not be considered to be conspicuous. 
 144  Presumably, most courts would assume that if an individual signs a sheet of 
paper that only contains the waiver, that individual recognizes that she is signing a 
waiver of some sort. This is not to say, though, that a waiver that is conspicuous cannot 
be found to have other drafting problems. See infra Subsection III.A.1. 
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3. Unconscionability 
Finally, a court may deem a waiver unenforceable if it finds 
the waiver to be unconscionable. Unconscionability is 
commonly defined as “[t]he principle that a court may refuse to 
enforce a contract that is unfair or oppressive because of 
procedural abuses during contract formation or because of 
overreaching contractual terms, [especially] terms that are 
unreasonably favorable to one party while precluding 
meaningful choice for the other party.”145 Typically in the 
waiver context, courts refuse to find waivers enforceable where 
the waivers were signed by parties who did not have a 
reasonable opportunity to reject or modify the agreements.146 
A state appellate court in Wisconsin, for example, found 
that a waiver presented to the visitors of the Lake Geneva 
Raceway (Raceway) was not enforceable on the basis of 
unconscionability.147 Catherine Nyman was presented with a 
waiver upon entering the parking lot of the Raceway, and she 
asked the Raceway employee who gave her the form what the 
form was for, specifically asking if the form was intended to 
waive claims for injuries sustained at the Raceway.148 The 
employee did not answer her, and Nyman signed the form 
without reading it to enter the Raceway.149 The waiver freed 
the Raceway from any liability resulting from injury or death 
to the visitors of the Raceway if they were in the “restricted 
area.”150 Upon entering the Raceway, Nyman watched a 
motorbike race from the “bleacher area” of the Raceway, which 
was not marked in any way as being part of the “restricted 
area” referenced in the waiver.151 Nyman was injured when a 
motorbike struck her while she was in the “bleacher area” of 
the Raceway.152 Nyman sued the Raceway for negligence, and 
the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
 
 145  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1664 (9th ed. 2009). 
 146  See Nelson, supra note 129, at 548–49. 
 147  See generally Eder v. Lake Geneva Raceway, Inc., 523 N.W.2d 429 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1994). 
 148  Id. at 431. Another litigant, Kristine Kaskowski, noted that the text of the 
form “‘was so small it could not be read rapidly.’” Id. 
 149  Id. Nyman testified that she felt rushed in signing the form, as she had a line 
of cars behind her waiting to enter the parking lot as well. Id. 
 150  Id. 
 151  Id. 
 152  Id. 
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Raceway, finding that the waiver was enforceable.153 
On appeal, the court determined “that the exculpatory 
contract here was not consistent with the principles of freedom 
of contract,” which the court defined to “protect[ ] the justifiable 
expectations of parties to an agreement, free from 
governmental interference.”154 In making this determination, 
the court considered that the Raceway was not “willing to 
discuss the terms,” nor did the Raceway “intend[] to engage in 
a process whereby . . . Nyman could form the required intent to 
be bound to certain terms.”155 The Raceway did not provide 
Nyman with a reasonable opportunity to read the terms of the 
waiver and to object or ask for clarification regarding specific 
parts of the contract.156 Because Nyman was unable to engage 
in making a meaningful choice in deciding to sign the waiver, 
the court held that the waiver was unenforceable as 
unconscionable.157 
Similarly, unconscionability has been found by courts in 
situations where there is unequal bargaining power between 
the parties.158 For instance, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a jury 
finding that an unequal bargaining power existed between 
Arnold Oil Properties, LLC (Arnold) and Schlumberger 
Technology Corp. (Schlumberger).159 In this case, Arnold hired 
Schlumberger for a cement job, which was completed 
negligently.160 After the cement had been poured but before the 
negligence could be discovered, Schlumberger presented Arnold 
with a contract, which indemnified Schlumberger from “all 
claims arising out of or in connection with damage to or loss or 
destruction of property . . . arising out of or in connection with 
 
 153  Id. Specifically, the trial court noted that Nyman should not be freed from the 
contract due to her own failure to read the contract. Id. 
 154  Id. at 432. 
 155  Id. 
 156  Id. 
 157  See generally id. Interestingly, the court does not seem to use the language of 
“unconscionability” in forming its opinion and rather relies simply on finding the 
waiver unenforceable on the grounds of public policy. Id. However, the reasoning of the 
court is analogous to the definition of “unconscionability” in Black’s Law Dictionary. 
See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 158  Arguably, there may have been unequal bargaining power present in the 
Eder case, as Nyman was not given the opportunity to bargain at all, especially 
because the Raceway employees failed to answer her questions about the waiver. Eder, 
523 N.W.2d at 432. 
 159  See generally Arnold Oil Properties LLC v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 672 
F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 160  Id. at 1204–05. 
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the contract or the services provided hereunder,” and which 
also included a “Special Indemnity” clause and a “Limitation of 
Liability” clause.161 Arnold signed the contract on an electronic 
signature pad, which did not display the language of the 
contract between the parties.162 After the negligence was 
discovered, Arnold brought suit against Schlumberger, and a 
jury found that the parties had unequal bargaining power, 
rendering the contract unenforceable.163 
On appeal, the court considered, among other things, 
whether the jury’s finding that an unequal bargaining power 
existed was appropriate and determined that evidence 
presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to make such a 
finding.164 The court noted that 
(1) the . . . cement top was “critical” to Arnold’s production 
from the well; (2) three companies were able to perform the 
work Arnold needed; (3) all three companies used 
standardized contracts with similar “onerous” terms 
regarding liability; (4) in Arnold’s chief operating officer’s 
experience, the terms were non-negotiable; and (5) a 
Schlumberger employee who has performed hundreds of 
cement jobs has never been asked to modify the terms of the 
contract, nor does he have the authority to do so.165 
Given this evidence, the appellate court determined that 
the evidence provided at trial was sufficient for the jury to find 
that an unequal bargaining power existed between the parties, 
as Arnold had no reasonable choice in signing the agreement.166 
B. Waivers Unenforceable Due to Public Policy 
A waiver can also be rendered unenforceable for reasons 
outside those grounded in contract law, as waivers can be 
deemed unenforceable as a matter of public policy.167 There are 
four main public policy considerations that can make a waiver 
unenforceable: (1) a waiver “being used in the context of 
services that are highly important or essential to the public”; 
(2) a waiver “asking signers to release liability for extreme 
 
 161  Id. at 1205. 
 162  Id. 
 163  Id. at 1206. 
 164  Id. 
 165  Id. at 1208 (citation omitted). 
 166  Id. 
 167  See Nelson, supra note 129, at 550. 
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conduct such as gross negligence, recklessness, or willful 
misconduct”; (3) a waiver “seeking to release a duty of care 
established by statute”; and (4) a waiver “being used by or on 
behalf of children.”168 Only waivers necessary for the public 
good and waivers releasing liability for gross negligence are 
relevant to suicide waivers used by higher-education 
institutions; accordingly, the other two types of waivers are not 
discussed further in this Article.169 
1. Services Necessary for the Public Good 
In Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, the 
Supreme Court of California articulated a six-factor balancing 
test to determine when a service is necessary for the good of 
the public.170 These six factors, none of which is independently 
dispositive, are (1) “[w]hen the activity at issue ‘concerns a 
business of a type generally thought suitable for public 
regulation’”; (2) “[w]hen the party seeking to enforce the release 
and be relieved of liability is ‘engaged in performing a service of 
great importance to the public, which is often a matter of 
practical necessity for some members of the public’”; (3) “[w]hen 
‘[t]he party holds himself out as willing to perform this service 
for any member of the public who seeks it’”; (4) “[w]hen as a 
result of the essential nature of the service, the party seeking 
exculpation holds ‘a decisive advantage of bargaining strength 
against any member of the public who seeks his services’”; (5) 
“[w]hen ‘in exercising a superior bargaining power the party 
confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of 
exculpation [with no provision for payment of additional fees 
to] obtain protection against negligence’”; and (6) “[w]hen ‘as a 
result of the transaction, the person or property of the 
purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to 
 
 168  Id. 
 169  However, if the suicide waivers discussed in this Article were to be adopted 
by private juvenile detention facilities, the public policy concern regarding children 
would be applicable. For a discussion of private juvenile detention facilities, see 
generally Brittney Kern, Giving New Meaning to ‘Justice for All’: Crafting an Exception 
to Absolute Judicial Immunity, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 148 (discussing the Cash for 
Kids scandal that led dozens of juveniles to be sentenced to a private juvenile detention 
facility in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania). See also infra Section V.C. 
 170  See generally Tunkl v. Regents of University of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963). 
See also Nelson, supra note 129, at 550–51; Connell & Savage, supra note 134, at 582–
83. 
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the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.’”171 Services 
that have been considered necessary to the public good include 
hospitalization services, health care services, “banking and 
escrow services, services involving public carriers, and public 
school sports programs.”172 
2. Gross Negligence and Reckless Behavior 
Courts generally hold that individuals cannot waive 
liability for the gross negligence, recklessness, or willful 
misconduct of another.173 The Supreme Court of Nebraska 
considered a contract that waived gross negligence in New 
Light Company, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services.174 New 
Light Company (New Light) and Wells Fargo Alarm Services 
(Wells Fargo) entered into an agreement in which Wells Fargo 
would install fire alarms at The Great Wall Restaurant, which 
was owned and operated by New Light.175 The parties signed a 
renewal agreement in 1988, five years after the fire alarms 
were installed, and the renewal agreement “contained an 
exculpatory clause stating that New Light agreed that Wells 
Fargo would not be liable for any loss or damage, irrespective 
of origin, to persons or property whether directly or indirectly 
caused by performance or nonperformance of any obligation 
imposed by the agreement or ‘by negligent acts or omissions of 
Wells Fargo Alarm, its agents or employees.’”176 In 1989, a fire 
occurred in the restaurant, and because “Wells Fargo failed to 
install a fire-sensing device in the basement-level clothes dryer 
room or the adjoining electrical room, which contained the 
main fire alarm control panel and its connection to the 
telephone junction box,” the alert system did not function.177 As 
 
 171  Connell & Savage, supra note 134, at 583 (quoting Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445–
46). Courts have held that the third factor can be counted in favor of finding that the 
service was one necessary for the good of the public even when the entire public could 
not partake in the service, such that the service was limited to certain individuals who 
met listed criteria. See Nelson, supra note 129, at 551 (listing the third factor instead 
as “[t]he party holds himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of 
the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain established 
standards).” 
 172  Nelson, supra note 129, at 551. 
 173  See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 174  See generally New Light Company, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services, 525 
N.W.2d 25 (1994). 
 175  Id. at 27. 
 176  Id. 
 177  Id. at 28. 
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a result, the restaurant suffered major damage from the fire.178 
In evaluating whether the waiver freed Wells Fargo from 
any liability for the fire, the court noted that “[w]hether a 
particular exculpatory clause in a contractual agreement 
violates public policy depends upon the facts and circumstances 
of the agreement and the parties involved. . . . The greater the 
threat to the general safety of the community, the greater the 
restriction on the party’s freedom to contractually limit the 
party’s liability.”179 Here, because the court found that there 
was a significant danger caused to the public as a result of 
Wells Fargo’s gross negligence, the ability of Wells Fargo and 
New Light to form a contract involving Wells Fargo’s liability is 
outweighed by the public policy considerations, and the court 
determined that the waiver was ineffective against New Light’s 
claim of gross negligence.180 
IV. COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF SUICIDE WAIVERS 
Having explored the doctrine of waivers and the primary 
reasons for which courts can find waivers to be unenforceable, 
this Part considers whether courts are likely to enforce suicide 
waivers presented by universities to students and aims to find 
actions that the schools can take to increase the likelihood that 
courts would enforce suicide waivers. 
This Part does not discuss in detail drafting problems that 
can render a waiver unenforceable or the need for universities 
to use conspicuous language when creating the waiver. 
However, as discussed in the previous Part, in drafting any 
suicide waiver it is essential not only that universities use 
language that students would be able to understand, but also 
that if the waiver is contained within a larger contract, the 
waiver itself is clearly identified by using a larger typeface, 
highlighting the language, or requiring the student to initial or 
sign where the waiver language actually appears. 
 
 178  Id. 
 179  Id. at 30. To illustrate this point, the court noted that “a contractual 
agreement to dig a ditch does not have the same public policy considerations as would 
the installation of a fire alarm system in a school, hospital, nursing home, restaurant, 
or other heavily occupied building.” Id. 
 180  Id. at 30–31. Notably, the court did not determine that the contract as a 
whole was unenforceable, so if a similar claim were to arise out of an identical contract 
that was for negligence, rather than gross negligence, it is likely that the court would 
deem the waiver to be enforceable against this new claim. 
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A. Unconscionability 
As illustrated in the previous Part, courts are likely to find 
that a waiver is unenforceable for being unconscionable if (1) 
the contract is “unfair or oppressive because of procedural 
abuses during contract formation”; or (2) there are 
“overreaching contractual terms, [especially] terms that are 
unreasonably favorable to one party while precluding 
meaningful choice for the other party.”181 Suicide waivers could 
be found unenforceable for either of these reasons if the 
universities promoting the waivers do not take steps to help 
ensure the contract is deemed enforceable. 
1. Procedural Abuses During Contract Formation 
Universities must ensure that there are no “procedural 
abuses during contract formation.”182 This language can be 
interpreted in two ways. First, courts likely would not enforce a 
waiver disclaiming liability for the university if it is presented 
to a student who is already invested in the educational 
program. For example, if Student at University is already 
enrolled in the school, has completed six semesters of study, 
and only has two semesters left to graduate from University 
when she is required by University to sign a suicide waiver 
that disclaims all liability on the part of University if Student 
commits suicide or otherwise inflicts self-harm, Student is 
likely to win on an argument that she had no real choice but to 
sign the waiver because it would be impractical for her to 
transfer to a different school to complete her program.183 On the 
 
 181  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1664 (9th ed. 2009). 
 182  Id. 
 183  A court evaluating a case of first impression concerning a waiver for suicide 
liability on the part of a university may analogize the enforceability of this type of 
waiver to non-compete clauses in employment agreements. In these clauses, the 
employee signs an agreement in which the employee agrees not to work in a narrow 
field in a certain geographic area for a specific period of time following the employee’s 
relationship with the original employer. Courts have regularly determined that these 
clauses are enforceable, but only if they meet certain requirements. First, the non-
compete clauses must have a purpose that is not primarily to restrict competition. 
Diederich Ins. Agency, LLC v. Smith, 952 N.E.2d 165, 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (citing 
Woodfield Group, Inc. v. DeLisle, 693 N.E.2d 464, 466–67 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)). Second, 
the non-compete clause will only be enforceable if the terms of the clause are 
reasonable. Id. “‘It must be reasonable in geographic and temporal scope and necessary 
to protect a legitimate business interest of the employer.’” Id. (internal citation 
omitted). Finally, the non-compete clause “‘must be ancillary to a valid contract, that 
is, it must be subordinate to the contract’s main purpose’” and “‘there must be adequate 
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other hand, however, if Incoming Freshman was asked to sign 
the suicide waiver provided to him by University in the 
summer before enrolling in University, before Incoming 
Freshman had paid any tuition to University or began classes, 
a court would likely determine that if Incoming Freshman 
wishes not to sign University’s waiver, he can choose to not 
sign the suicide waiver and to instead attend another school 
that does not require a suicide waiver.184 As discussed in Part 
III, courts determine unconscionability by looking at the 
specific facts of each situation.185 Therefore, it would be 
imperative for colleges that wish to implement a suicide 
liability waiver to present the waiver to incoming students, not 
to students already enrolled in the school who have little choice 
but to sign the waiver. By giving incoming students the option 
to sign the waiver or to attend a different school, the colleges 
would effectively preempt any unconscionability claim brought 
in this manner. 
Second, courts likely would not enforce a waiver if the 
student were not given the opportunity to read and object to 
the terms of the waiver. As illustrated in Eden, in which 
 
consideration to support the covenant.’” Id. The most relevant aspect of the non-
compete clause to the suicide liability waiver is this final component. Courts will likely 
only determine that the clauses will be enforceable if the waiver language is ancillary 
to a valid contract and if there is adequate consideration for the agreement. In order for 
the waiver to be ancillary to a valid contract, the waiver language should be presented 
to the potential student at a time logical for the student to be signing forms, such as 
when the student is enrolling in her first semester of study. The waiver would be only a 
subset of the documentation that would need to be signed and agreed to by the student. 
In order for the waiver to be enforceable, there must be consideration to support it. If 
the student signs the waiver as a condition of enrolling in the school, a court would be 
likely to find sufficient consideration, as the student is suffering a legal detriment by 
allowing the school to be free from liability should the student commit suicide, and the 
school is providing the student with an opportunity to study at the university. If this 
waiver language were presented to the student later in the student’s career, after the 
student had already commenced studying at the university, it is likely that a court 
would not find a valid consideration on the part of the school, and therefore the court 
would likely hold the waiver to be unenforceable. 
 184  This scenario would likely be similar to a situation in which an employee was 
presented with a non-compete clause at the time of the commencement of employment. 
At this point, the employee is able to negotiate for more beneficial terms in the overall 
employment contract, using the non-compete clause as a negotiation tool that favors 
the employer. If the employee is presented with this non-compete further in the 
employee’s employment, the employee has no reasonable opportunity to negotiate for 
other beneficial employment terms. At the beginning of the employment agreement, 
employee is free to decline employment or bargain for better terms. Similarly, at the 
commencement of enrollment, Incoming Freshman is able to enroll in a different school 
that does not require a suicide liability waiver. 
 185  See supra notes 1455–1666 and accompanying text. 
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Nyman was asked to sign a waiver in her car with no time to 
read the contract or to ask questions, it would be imperative for 
universities wishing to implement a suicide waiver to give 
students an opportunity to read through the waiver, ask the 
university questions regarding the waiver, retain counsel to 
advise them regarding the waiver, and, where appropriate, 
request that the university modify the waiver. Therefore, 
universities should mail the waiver to incoming students’ 
permanent address during the summer before the students are 
due to enroll at the university. This would provide the students 
with ample time to consider their own best interests in signing 
the waivers and, consistent with the first consideration, make 
alternate arrangements for themselves if they determine that 
they are unwilling to sign the waiver. This suggestion would be 
significantly better than, for example, universities distributing 
the waiver during an in-person, new student orientation and 
requiring that students return the waiver to them that same 
day. Though this method would provide students with enough 
time to read through the waiver themselves, it likely would not 
provide ample time for students to ask meaningful questions 
about the waiver, consult with outside counsel, or request 
modifications to the waiver. As such, if this latter approach 
were taken, it would be likely that courts would hold the 
waivers unenforceable under the doctrine of unconscionability. 
2. Unreasonably Favorable Language with No Meaningful 
Choice 
Additionally, a court may find that a waiver is 
unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, if (1) the waiver 
includes language that is unreasonably favorable towards one 
party; or (2) the parties to the waiver have unequal bargaining 
power. 
First, courts may determine that language that is 
unreasonably favorable to the universities would be 
unenforceable. In order to avoid this scenario, universities 
drafting suicide waivers should include procedures that the 
universities will put into place to help students who reach out 
to faculty or staff of the university when expressing suicidal 
tendencies or who otherwise ask for help from the universities. 
For example, universities wishing to implement suicide 
liability waivers should ensure that the schools have 
counseling programs, or at least referral services to 
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nonaffiliated counseling services, for use by enrolled students 
who express a desire or a need for mental-health treatment or 
assistance. If the universities include language in the liability 
waivers that explain the steps a student can take to gain help 
and support from the universities—and the schools actually 
maintain such services—courts would likely find that students 
who have signed a suicide liability waiver and committed or 
attempted suicide without first utilizing the services available 
at the schools have effectively waived their rights to sue the 
university for negligence in their resulting deaths or injuries. 
If, however, the universities draft suicide liability waivers that 
explain that students and their families may not hold the 
schools liable in the event of suicide and that students who 
express suicidal tendencies will be expelled from the 
universities and evicted from on-campus housing, without 
providing any support for students or otherwise providing any 
language favorable to students, courts would likely hold this 
type of suicide waiver unenforceable as unconscionable, as the 
terms of the waiver would disproportionately benefit the 
universities. 
Second, courts would likely hold the waivers to be 
unconscionable if the parties have unequal bargaining power, 
as the Tenth Circuit held in Arnold Oil Properties LLC v. 
Schlumberger Technology Corp.186 Unequal bargaining power is 
a question of fact to be determined by a jury, and juries decide 
whether unequal bargaining power exists based on the specific 
facts of the case.187 In order for courts to hold that universities 
and their students have equal bargaining power, universities 
should be willing to modify the suicide waivers if requested by 
the students. Additionally, because the universities would 
certainly have the support of lawyers in drafting the suicide 
liability waivers, students must be given an opportunity to 
consult with outside counsel before signing themselves, which 
would help create a more equal bargaining power. 
B. Services Necessary for the Public Good 
According to the Tunkl court, a waiver may be deemed 
unenforceable if it waives liability for a service that is deemed 
 
 186  See Arnold Oil Properties LLC v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 672 F.3d 1202 
(10th Cir. 2012). 
 187  See id. 
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necessary or essential for the good of the public.188 In that case, 
the California state court created a list of six factors that are 
weighed to determine whether a service is necessary or 
essential for the good of the public.189 
The first factor considers whether the activity “‘concerns a 
business of a type generally thought suitable for public 
regulation.’”190 Depending on whether the universities 
implementing suicide waivers are public or private, this factor 
could weigh in favor of finding that the schools are necessary 
for the public good, as public universities are regulated by state 
governments. However, private schools likely would not satisfy 
this factor. 
The second factor asks whether the schools are “‘engaged in 
performing a service of great importance to the public, which is 
often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the 
public.’”191 Universities are generally considered important to 
the public, as it is a “‘practical necessity’” that at least some 
members of society are college educated.192 However, 
universities do not perform services that are immediately 
necessary to help society function, such as public 
transportation or medical services. Therefore, this factor would 
need to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
The third factor considers whether the schools are “‘willing 
to perform [their] services for any member of the public who 
seeks it.’”193 As noted in footnote 171, this factor is still relevant 
even if the services are only provided to select members of the 
public who meet certain criteria.194 Therefore, even though 
most universities have some sort of criteria that prospective 
students must meet before enrolling in the schools, this factor 
 
 188  See supra notes170–172 and accompanying text. 
 189  See supra notes170–172 and accompanying text. 
 190  Connell & Savage, supra note 134, at 584 (quoting Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445–
46). 
 191  Connell & Savage, supra note 134, at 584 (quoting Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445–
46). 
 192  There certainly is an argument to be made that universities are not a 
practical necessity in this way; however, if universities ceased to exist, occupations that 
require intensive and expansive education, such as doctors, lawyers, and engineers, 
would no longer exist. While this example seems somewhat extreme, universities serve 
a very practical function in ensuring that society is able to thrive by educating the 
individuals who are the future of these highly specialized occupations. 
 193  Connell & Savage, supra note 134, at 584 (quoting Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445–
46). 
 194  See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
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is likely met because the schools are open to educating any (or 
a subset of any class of) individuals who meet the criteria set 
forth by the school. 
The fourth factor considers whether the schools “hold[] ‘a 
decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member 
of the public who seeks his services.’”195 While the last Section 
provided ways in which universities could avoid a finding of 
unequal bargaining power,196 schools as a whole would likely 
still satisfy this factor, as universities have less to lose than 
students if students decide not to sign the suicide liability 
waivers. Students refusing to sign would need to find a new 
school in which to enroll, while universities would merely have 
to choose from other students interested in attending the 
universities to fill the spots of students unwilling to sign the 
waiver. So, while schools may try to ensure that a court finds 
that no unequal bargaining power exists, the universities will 
likely always be in a better bargaining position, especially as 
against individual students.197 However, if the schools are 
willing to compromise on the language of the waivers and will 
at least consider modifying the language if students request 
modifications, then courts would likely be more willing to 
determine that there is not unequal bargaining power between 
the parties. 
The fifth factor examines whether schools would provide 
their students “‘with a standardized adhesion contract of 
exculpation [with no provision for payment of additional fees 
to] obtain protection against negligence.’”198 Despite the 
recommendation in the previous Section that universities be 
willing to modify the agreements if the modifications do not 
alter the fundamental terms of the waiver, this factor could be 
met if the universities refuse to modify the waivers or use a 
one-size-fits-all waiver for their student bodies.199 Additionally, 
 
 195  Connell & Savage, supra note 134, at 584 (quoting Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445–
46). 
 196  See supra Section IV.A.2. 
 197  If, however, one school in the United States were to implement a suicide 
liability waiver and prospective students either boycotted the school in large numbers 
or otherwise banded together to fight the waiver, this factor might not be satisfied, as 
the bargaining powers between a school desperate to enroll students and a band of 
students refusing to sign the waiver may be more equal. 
 198  Connell & Savage, supra note 134, at 583 (quoting Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445–
46). 
 199  See supra Section IV.A. 
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it likely would not be advantageous for universities to offer an 
option for the students to pay additional fees to avoid signing 
the waiver, as students likely to pay this fee are those who 
have previously experienced suicidal thoughts or tendencies, 
making them the students that the universities would most 
want to protect themselves against. 
Finally, the sixth factor considers whether the students 
would be placed under the control of the universities “‘subject 
to the risk of carelessness by the [school] or [its] agents.’”200 
This factor is reminiscent of the Leary case, in which Wesleyan 
University’s public safety officers transported Leary to the 
hospital and left him without securing care for him.201 The 
court in that case determined that there was a genuine 
question of fact concerning whether Wesleyan University had 
custody of Leary, thereby leaving Leary helpless.202 This factor 
is unable to be predicted in the abstract, however, without 
having specific facts of the individual situations, and therefore 
courts would likely consider this factor on a case-by-case basis. 
Even excluding the sixth factor, which would need to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis using the specific factual 
scenario, it is likely that courts could find that universities 
meet each of the first five factors and would be considered 
essential for the good of the public. If this standard were met, 
then higher education, and therefore universities, may be 
deemed necessary for the public good, and universities would 
therefore be unable to enforce suicide liability waivers in court, 
following the precedent of Tunkl.203 However, it is also 
plausible that none or few of the factors could be met, which 
would render the necessary-to-the-public-good doctrine 
unhelpful in defending against enforcement of the waivers. 
C. Gross Negligence and Reckless Behavior 
Finally, courts may find that suicide liability waivers are 
unenforceable if the universities attempt to waive liability for 
grossly negligent or reckless behavior. For example, the actions 
of MIT, in not following up on the report from Shin’s friends 
 
 200  Connell & Savage, supra note 134, at 584 (quoting Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445–
46). 
 201  See supra notes 105–118 and accompanying text. 
 202  See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 203  See supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text. 
Kern, Edited (Do Not Delete) 3/9/2015  12:03 PM 
1] BALANCING PREVENTION AND LIABILITY 261 
that Shin intended to commit suicide on the day that she did in 
fact commit suicide, could be determined to be grossly 
negligent.204 If a court were to find that a university was 
grossly negligent in handling a suicidal student, then a suicide 
liability waiver would not be enforceable, regardless of whether 
the same waiver would be enforceable if used to defend against 
a simple negligence claim. 
Therefore, universities would need to ensure that they act 
in such a way that cannot be construed as grossly negligent or 
reckless. This would require universities to respond seriously 
to students’ reports of their own or another student’s suicidal 
behavior or thoughts. Additionally, universities would need to 
employ counselors who are trained to respond to students 
having suicidal thoughts or engaging in suicidal activities. At a 
minimum, the universities should have referral programs 
available for outside counselors. This would make it more 
feasible for smaller schools to provide resources to their 
students, as hiring full-time counselors may not be possible for 
small institutions. Finally, universities should consider 
implementing mandatory educational sessions for students 
that teach the warning signs of suicidal behavior so that other 
students can be resources for their peers, even if that only 
leads to students asking the universities for help on behalf of 
their peers. These actions, if implemented and maintained by 
universities, would likely help support findings that no gross 
negligence or reckless disregard for the safety of students 
exists because they show the universities’ efforts to fulfill their 
legal duties to their students. 
If universities that wish to implement suicide liability 
waivers adapt even some of the suggestions provided in this 
Part, courts would be less likely to find the waivers 
unenforceable under contract law or public policy. However, 
universities would need to evaluate their own circumstances 
individually to determine the best options for them, as some of 
these options would only work in limited circumstances. If 
 
 204  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “gross negligence” as “[a] conscious, voluntary 
act or omission in reckless disregard of a legal duty and of the consequences to another 
party, who may typically recover exemplary damages.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1133–
34 (9th ed. 2009). Though it was never settled as to whether MIT had a special duty 
towards Shin, the trial court judge found that a genuine issue of material fact existed 
as to whether a special duty existed. See supra notes102–104 and accompanying text. If 
a jury were to find that a special duty did exist, then MIT’s actions would likely rise to 
the definition of gross negligence, as opposed to just negligence. 
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suicide liability waivers begin to be adopted by universities, 
however, there is little doubt that universities, courts, and 
perhaps legislatures would help determine the ideal conditions 
for which the waivers would be deemed enforceable. 
V. ARE SUICIDE WAIVERS THE ANSWER? UNIVERSITY OPTIONS 
FOR PREVENTING LIABILITY AND DETERRING STUDENT SUICIDE 
A. Impact of Suicide Waivers 
Assuming arguendo that courts would generally accept 
suicide liability waivers as enforceable, universities need to 
consider whether the benefits of these waivers are worth the 
possible costs. The benefits of the waivers to schools are quite 
obvious; schools that successfully implement suicide liability 
waivers would be protected from negligence claims from 
students and their families for suicides and episodes of self-
harm, regardless of whether a special relationship exists 
between the schools and the students. Given the recent 
decisions in trial courts throughout the country that suggest 
that a special relationship may be formed between schools and 
their students,205 the benefits of such waivers are clear; the 
waivers would not only protect the schools from civil damages, 
but they would also prevent negligence cases against the 
schools from continuing past the summary judgment stages of 
a lawsuit. These waivers, then, would save the universities 
that successfully implement them a great deal of expense and 
time in defending themselves in lawsuits. 
Additionally, universities implementing the waivers would 
not need to worry about their behavior in helping treat the 
students who show suicidal tendencies, assuming that the 
universities’ behavior did not rise to the level of gross 
negligence or reckless disregard. This is really a benefit to both 
the universities and to the students. The universities would 
benefit because they would be able to provide help to their 
students, which most universities would likely prefer to do 
rather than expel the students or evict them from campus 
housing if the student shows signs of suicidal tendencies or 
 
 205  See generally Shin v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, No. 020403, 
2005 WL 1869101 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 27, 2005); Schieszler v. Ferrum College, 236 
F. Supp. 2d 602 (W.D. Va. 2002); Leary v. Wesleyan University, No. CV055003943, 
2009 WL 865679 (Super. Ct. Conn. March 10, 2009). 
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mental health diseases.206 While the universities would want to 
keep costs at a minimum, and therefore may not want to spend 
any excessive money on counseling and treatment for mental-
health diseases for their students, the individual counselors at 
the universities would likely be elated to know that they would 
be able to provide counseling to their students without risking 
liability should the student take a drastic action. For example, 
Jacquelyn Kondrot, the counselor employed by Alleghany 
College who met with Chuck Mahoney for the three years that 
Mahoney was a student at the college, seemed to genuinely 
care about treating Mahoney and wanted to ensure that 
Mahoney was safe.207 In the “Notes of Dictation” that Kondrot 
recorded regarding a therapy session with Mahoney, Kondrot 
stated that “[a]t this point, I had tears in my eyes and felt 
concerned and frustrated with [Mahoney’s] resistance.”208 
Kondrot clearly had formed a relationship with Mahoney and 
was genuinely concerned about his well being, and it is likely 
that many counselors employed by universities would have 
similar reactions in analogous situations. Because of this, the 
counselors would benefit from knowing that they could 
intervene as they saw fit—so long as their actions did not 
amount to gross negligence or recklessness—without worrying 
about personal liability if the students they are attempting to 
aid later commit or attempt suicide. 
Students would benefit because the students would be more 
likely to receive the help they need from their schools, through 
either on-campus counseling or referrals to unaffiliated 
counseling programs. Also, students would not need to worry 
about being expelled or evicted if they showed signs of 
depression or other mental health diseases.209 And, perhaps 
 
 206  Universities may not see an obvious benefit here, as increasing resources for 
students would lead to increasing costs for the institutions. However, the positive 
publicity would likely outweigh this cost, especially if universities advertise their 
student health programs. For many prospective students, especially those with past 
histories of mental-health diseases, university-sponsored programs may be the factor 
that convinces these students to enroll. Further, if universities fail to provide any 
support for their students and instead expel or evict them, such as what occurred to 
Jordan Nott when he was enrolled at GW, the negative publicity could cost the school 
more financially than it would have cost to implement mental health programs at the 
school. 
 207  See supra notes 46–52 and accompanying text. 
 208  Mahoney v. Alleghany College, No. AD 892–2003 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 22, 
2005), available at http://www.bsk.com/site/files/Mahoney_v._Allegheny_College.pdf. 
 209  See supra notes 120–128 and accompanying text. 
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even more importantly, students would not be incentivized to 
hide mental health diseases if they knew that they would be 
able to remain in school and in their housing if they show signs 
of mental illness.210 
However, there are very real costs to universities who 
choose to implement suicide liability waivers, particularly for 
those schools that act first in requiring students to sign the 
waivers. First, it is extremely likely that the first waivers 
would be litigated to determine whether, in fact, university 
suicide liability waivers are enforceable. If the universities take 
the suggestions listed in the previous Section to help promote 
the enforceability of the waivers, it is unlikely that the schools 
would end up paying damages to students or their families for 
negligence on the part of the school covered by the waiver. But 
the schools would need to defend themselves in the litigation, 
which would exhaust many resources. Second, the first schools 
to adopt suicide liability waivers may be subjected to negative 
publicity, as the waivers, at first, seem to benefit only the 
universities and not the students who sign them. However, if 
enough schools implement the waivers, they likely would 
become more accepted and common in higher education. 
Additionally, if the universities implementing these waivers 
create superior resources for students struggling with mental-
health diseases, then the public would likely be encouraged by 
the increased benefits to these students. Until this happens, 
though, the first adopters may miss out on students who would 
otherwise attend their schools, but who choose not to do so to 
avoid signing the waivers. 
An unfortunate reality that must also be considered is that 
a waiver of school liability for students’ suicides or self-
harming actions will almost certainly not, in and of itself, deter 
student suicide. Individuals who are prone to suicide are 
unlikely to change their mind based solely on a contract signed 
that limits the liability for the suicide, especially if that waiver 
was signed months or even years before the suicide occurred. 
However, the benefits to students are not in having to sign the 
 
 210  A further concern for schools like GW is that students will feign recovery 
signs to avoid being expelled or evicted, which presumably would open up universities 
to more liability if these students were to later commit suicide or otherwise self-harm. 
If schools removed the policy to expel or evict, students would be less likely to hide 
their symptoms and seek the help they need. See supra notes 120–128 and 
accompanying text. 
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waiver directly, but come from the universities being more 
willing to accommodate and support students who show 
suicidal tendencies than they otherwise may be if the 
universities had to worry about their own liability. Therefore, 
while critics of the waiver likely will argue that this type of 
waiver would do nothing to directly curb student suicide, the 
secondary effects of imposing this type of waiver would 
ultimately help students in need. 
In order for students to truly be benefitted, however, 
schools implementing these waivers would need to create 
superior resources for counseling and treatment of mental-
health diseases. It would be ineffective for treatment purposes 
for the schools to simply use the waivers without providing 
further resources for their students. It is unlikely that schools 
would choose to spend money on mental-health programs as 
opposed to sporting programs, new buildings, and emerging 
technology, all of which would garner immediate and positive 
publicity. However, with the increased suicide rates among 
college students throughout the country, schools should 
consider the negative implications that attach when a student 
at the university inflicts self-harm or commits suicide.211 For 
instance, GW faced harsh criticism when Nott’s story—of being 
evicted from student housing and threatened with expulsion if 
he failed to withdraw from the university—was publicized.212 If 
other students face similar responses from universities, it is 
only a matter of time before potential new students begin to 
seriously consider the mental-health facilities of potential 
colleges, especially if these students have a history of mental-
health diseases. In order to combat harsh publicity and to aid 
potential students who suffer from mental-health diseases, 
universities, especially those implementing a suicide liability 
waiver, need to address mental health counseling and 
treatment, and need to make student safety and health a 
 
 211  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 212  See, e.g., Brian Beutler, Psyched Out, WASH. CITY PAPER, June 3, 2005, 
available at http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/30692/psyched-out; Susan 
Kinzie, GWU Suit Prompts Questions of Liability, WASH. POST, Mar 10, 2005, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/03/09/AR2006030902550.html; Christine Lagorio, Depressing 
Times on Campus, CBS NEWS, Apr 5, 2005, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/depressing-times-on-campus/; Editorial, Depressed? Get 
Out!, WASH. POST, Mar 13, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/03/12/AR2006031200804.html. 
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priority. 
B. Other Options 
Having identified the costs and benefits of imposing suicide 
waivers, it is prudent to compare the expected impact of suicide 
waivers to other options that universities may consider instead. 
Two of these options that are especially likely include (1) school 
policies mandating contacting parents under the FERPA 
exception; and (2) expulsion or eviction of students who exhibit 
signs of mental illness. 
1. Disclosure Requirement in the Wake of FERPA 
As noted by the Jain and Mahoney cases, FERPA “permits 
institutions to disclose otherwise confidential information to 
‘appropriate parties’ when an ‘emergency’ makes it necessary 
‘to protect the health or safety of the student or other 
persons.’”213 This disclosure is discretionary under FERPA,214 
but universities may make policies either that make the 
disclosure mandatory if an employee of the school believes the 
situation is an “‘emergency’” or that clearly articulate a list of 
elements necessary for the universities to contact students’ 
parents. By implementing either form of these policies, 
universities would protect themselves in cases analogous to the 
Mahoney case, in which Kondrot debated contacting Mahoney’s 
parents to alert them to their son’s suicidal thoughts, but 
ultimately decided not to contact them.215 Having a clear, 
written policy in place would help protect the school in cases 
like these, as there would be fewer ambiguous decisions to be 
made in this regard. 
While implementing a policy that distinguished when to 
contact students’ parents under the FERPA exception is a 
possible route for universities, this option would likely not 
protect the universities as fully as would implementing 
mandatory suicide liability waivers, as the FERPA exception 
only covers one aspect of a potential suit, while the suicide 
liability waivers cover many more of the possible scenarios. 
However, universities may find that it would be ideal to 
 
 213  Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293, 298 (Iowa 2000) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 
1232g(b)(1)(I)). 
 214  See id. 
 215  See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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implement both of these options in order to provide parents of 
university students, especially those with knowledge of their 
children’s mental illnesses, information on how to become 
involved in the students’ treatment. 
2. Expulsion from School or Eviction from Dorm Housing 
Some universities, including GW, have implemented 
policies of expelling and/or evicting students who seek help for 
mental illness.216 When Jordan Nott, a student at GW, sought 
treatment for suicidal thoughts he experienced while taking a 
new medication, he was evicted from his on-campus housing a 
mere twelve hours after arriving at the GW hospital and was 
asked to withdraw—and threatened with suspension, 
expulsion, and criminal prosecution for trespassing if he did 
not withdraw from the school—twenty-four hours later.217 This 
type of policy opens universities up to a host of other problems, 
as evidenced in this GW example; Nott sued GW for violations 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, Fair 
Housing Act, and D.C. Human Rights Act and also for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, 
and breach of confidential relationship.218 
Policies like this one incentivize students to mask their 
symptoms and to not seek help, which could lead to even more 
opportunities for liability on the part of the universities. This 
would especially be the case, for example, if students fake 
recovery from their mental illnesses in order to remain enrolled 
in school. If these students later inflicted self-harm or 
committed suicide, it is likely that the students or their parents 
would have claims against the school for inflicting distress 
upon the students, as the school policy was a motivating factor 
in the students’ actions. 
Given the vast negative implications for policies that expel 
or evict students who seek help for their mental illnesses, 
suicide liability waivers provide far superior benefits to both 
universities and their students. As such, schools choosing 
between one of these policies should choose suicide liability 
waivers, and schools like GW that currently have the expulsion 
or eviction policy in place should consider switching their 
 
 216  See supra notes 1211–28 and accompanying text. 
 217  See supra notes 121–28 and accompanying text. 
 218  See supra notes 1211–28 and accompanying text. 
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policies, perhaps to use suicide liability waivers instead. 
C. Alternative Uses for Liability Waivers 
Suicide liability waivers could be applicable to forums other 
than universities. For instance, juvenile detention facilities and 
summer camps could also implement similar waivers for their 
residents. However, waivers in these forums may not be found 
enforceable for a reason previously excluded from this Article—
infancy of one of the contract parties. 
Juvenile detention facilities and summer camps often house 
individuals under the age of eighteen, who are not able to form 
many contractual relationships, including waivers of liability. 
For example, David Franco, a fourteen-year-old infant, signed a 
waiver, releasing defendant Louis Neglia Martial Arts 
Academy (Academy) from liability and from any action as a 
result of Franco sustaining an injury while participating in 
activities at the martial arts academy.219 Franco suffered a 
broken toe after being paired with an advanced martial arts 
partner on his first day at the academy, and Franco brought 
suit against Academy resulting from these injuries.220 The 
Supreme Court of New York did not reach the merits of the 
case, as the judge wrote that “[i]t is well settled that infants 
are not bound by releases or waivers[,] which exculpate 
defendants from liability for causes of action to recover 
damages for personal injuries since they lack the capacity to 
enter into such agreements.”221 Because of this, Academy’s 
motion for summary judgment was denied, as the waiver was 
deemed to be unenforceable as against Franco due to his 
infancy status.222 
As evidenced by the Franco case, a waiver agreement 
entered into by an individual under the age of eighteen will not 
be enforceable. However, juvenile detention facilities and 
summer camps may be able to enforce suicide liability 
agreements if the parents of the children affected by the 
waivers sign them as well. The enforceability of a waiver 
signed by the infant and by the infant’s parents or guardians is 
 
 219  Franco v. Neglia, 776 N.Y.S.2d 690, 691 (2004). 
 220  Id. 
 221  Id. (citing Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, 177 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1958) and 
People ex rel. Bymes v. Goldman, 302 N.Y.S.2d 926 (1969)). 
 222  Id. 
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not certain, however, as courts have determined that judicial 
approval is needed to enforce these agreements in order to 
ensure that the agreement is in the child’s best interest. In 
Gomes v. Hameed, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated that 
“[e]nforcement [of agreements not to sue] without court 
approval would allow the court to abandon its duty to guard 
the interests of minors in actions involving their rights. 
However, . . . the contract need not be approved before the 
exchanged promises are performed.”223 Therefore, even if the 
infant’s parent also signed the suicide liability waiver 
presented by a juvenile detention facility or a summer camp, a 
judge could find that the waiver was not executed in the 
infant’s best interest, and the waiver could be deemed 
unenforceable. 
While suicide liability waivers may be an option for other 
forums, such as juvenile detention facilities and summer 
camps, there is an added danger of the waivers being deemed 
unenforceable if the individual signing the waiver is under the 
age of eighteen. Because of these added risks, there are likely 
more fruitful options for organizations and facilities that house 
infants. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
With colleges facing an unprecedented number of student 
suicides, schools across the country need to reevaluate their 
policies for protecting themselves from liability and for 
deterring student suicide. And while no court has, to date, 
definitely found that a special relationship has existed between 
a school and a student that would leave the school vulnerable 
for a negligence claim, trial court judges have, in recent years, 
suggested that a jury could in fact find that a special 
relationship does exist between a school and a student. While 
suicide liability waivers, as those implemented in China, have 
been seen as somewhat drastic or surprising to some, waivers 
of this kind have the ability to protect both universities and 
students if adopted and implemented properly by the higher-
education institutions. Not only would these waivers 
incentivize universities to take further action and provide 
additional resources to assist students who suffer from mental-
 
 223  Gomes v. Hameed, 184 P.3d 479, 489 (Okla. 2008). 
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health diseases, but the universities also would be more 
protected from liability should a student or her parents sue the 
school following a suicide or infliction of self-harm. Perhaps 
higher-education institutions in the United States should adopt 
a form of the waiver sent to Ms. Li’s son, as these waivers may 
not only save university money, but may also save lives. 
